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1  Introduction 
Low fertility rates, aging populations, and the concern for long-term labor supply 
have inspired policy interest in how the availability and price of childcare services 
influence maternal labor supply and birth rates. Cross-country comparisons show 
that birth rates are indeed higher in OECD countries with high female labor force 
participation  and  wide  access  to  childcare  (D'Addio  and  Mira  d'Ercole,  2005). 
However, the direction of causality is not well understood.  
We aim to establish if, and how, childcare costs affect fertility. To this end, we 
use the quasi-experiment initiated by a Swedish childcare reform that standardized 
the fee schedules across Swedish municipalities and imposed a cap on childcare 
charges.  Consequently,  households  with  similar  characteristics  experienced 
different cost changes depending on where they lived, and households in a given 
municipality experienced different cost changes depending on characteristics such 
as household income and the number and age of the children. Hence, conditional on 
household characteristics, the reform introduced exogenous variation in childcare 
costs.  
Theoretical  models  of  fertility  and  maternal  labor  supply  (e.g.,  Ermisch, 
1989a, b;  Apps  and  Rees,  2004)  predict  that  reductions  in  childcare  costs  may 
affect both fertility and the labor supply of mothers. By increasing mothers’ take-
home wages, lower childcare costs make it more attractive to enter the labor market 
or  to  work  longer  hours.  However,  for  working  mothers,  lower  childcare  costs 
imply  a  direct  reduction  in  the  cost  of  having  children,  which  in  turn  should 
increase the demand for children. Hence, the effects of childcare costs on fertility 
are likely to depend on women’s labor supply decisions. A recent study by Lundin 
et  al.  (2008)  of  the  same  reform  that  we  investigate,  using  similar  estimation 
techniques, finds no effects on maternal labor supply, suggesting that fertility may 
be the margin of adjustment.
1 
                                                 
1 Note that even though maternal labor force participation is high in Sweden, many mothers with small children 
work part-time, so that there was the potential for an increased labor supply. The argument that there are no 
labor supply effects is strengthened by Wikström (2007), who shows that hours of care for children already 
enrolled increased only marginally as a result of the reform.     3 
Previous micro studies have found mixed support for the hypothesis that lower 
childcare charges increase fertility. Using American survey data, Blau and Robins 
(1989) conclude that higher childcare costs decrease the birth rates of unemployed 
women but have no effect on employed women. In a study of Italian data, Del Boca 
(2002) finds that both fertility and labor force participation are positively correlated 
with better access to childcare. These studies, however, suffer from endogeneity 
problems.  Both  the  availability  of  childcare  and  the  charges  actually  paid  by 
families  vary  according  to  local  governments’  response  to  demand  or  families’ 
individual choices about the quality and quantity of care.  
In a recent study, Schlosser (2006) examines the introduction of free public pre-
school for children aged 3 and 4 in Israel to estimate the effects of a reduction in 
childcare costs on Arab mothers' labor supply and fertility. She finds no effect on 
fertility but a positive effect on labor supply. Schlosser uses quasi-experimental 
data and is therefore more likely to capture causal effects rather than correlations. 
Given the context studied by Schlosser; a case where fertility was initially high, 
while maternal labor supply was very low, the results are perhaps not so surprising.  
Two recent studies on US data examine the effects on labor supply and fertility 
using changes in household service sector wages caused by low-wage immigration. 
Cortes and Tessada (2009) find positive effects on the female labor supply, and 
especially on highly educated mothers who worked longer hours. Furtado and Hock 
(2010) show that lower wages in the childcare sector resulted in higher fertility for 
highly educated women.
2 
The US context is  in many ways  similar to that studied here: most Swedish 
women work, have chil dren and use childcare. However, important differences 
exist, in particular regarding which groups were affected by the studied price 
changes. While low-skill immigration primarily lowered the price of flexible nanny 
services, making it easier for high -earning women to combine career and family, 
the present study examines changes in the  already low cost of publicly subsidized 
childcare during regular work hours. Another important difference is that the type 
of childcare studied in this paper is used by the vast majority of Swedish families. 
                                                 
2 In a related field, a number of studies investigate the impact of other financial incentives, such as child 
allowances and tax incentives, on fertility decisions (see e.g., Cohen et al, 2009, Kearney, 2004, Laroque and 
Salanié, 2004 and Milligan, 2005).     4 
In  2004,  the  attendance  rate  for  children  aged  3–6  was  90  percent.  Hence,  as 
opposed  to  the  American  price  reduction  studied  by  Cortes  and  Tessada  and 
Furtado and Hock, the Swedish price reduction is not targeted to any specific group 
of parents and was enjoyed by practically all Swedish families. However, given 
that publicly subsidized childcare is only available during regular working hours, 
there was limited possibility for families to demand more hours for childcare other 
than by enrolling more children. 
An important advantage of the present study is that we can estimate the effect of 
cost changes on a majority of households as opposed to reviewing only on a small 
part  of  the  population,  which  is  a  common  weakness  of  studies  using  quasi-
experiments. This significantly strengthens the external validity of our results (see 
discussion in Moffitt, 2005; and Angrist et al., 2007). 
We find only limited effects of the price changes on the fertility behavior of 
Swedish  families. The reduction in childcare cost had a positive  effect on first 
births in the order of magnitude of 7.5 (9.8) percent for a 10000 US dollar (or Euro) 
reduction in the present value of the future marginal child care costs.  For families 
with  children,  on  the  other  hand,  we  only  find  some  timing  effects  for  second 
births. They seem to have reacted rather immediately by postponing the second 
child when the election promise to cap childcare fees was announces, perhaps to 
make sure the reform was actually launched before they went ahead and had their 
second child. For families with two or more children, we find no effect of the 
marginal change in childcare costs.  However, in addition to marginal cost changes, 
families with children between the ages 1-10 also experienced changes to the child 
care costs of the children they already had. We find that the families reduced their 
fertility in response to the reduction in child care cost suggesting a negative income 
effect. 
Before we present the data, discuss our identification strategy in some detail, 
and arrive at estimation results, we provide background information on Swedish 
childcare  institutions  and  the  design  of  the  childcare  reform  of  2002.  We  also 
describe recent developments regarding birth rates for Swedish women.   5 
2   Institutional background 
2.1  Childcare in Sweden 
Sweden has a long tradition of publicly subsidized childcare for pre-school children 
and after-school care for young school-age children. Figure 1 shows the fraction of 
children attending some form of publicly subsidized childcare over time, by age. 
Enrollment  rates  have  increased  dramatically,  and  in  2004,  90  percent  of  all 
children in the 3–6 age group attended childcare.
3 The enrollment rate is also high 
for very young children (aged 1–2). One explanation for these high enrollment rates 
is thatlocal governments in Sweden are obliged by law to provide low-cost, high-
quality childcare for children aged 1–12 whose parents either work or are full-time 
students; care is to be arranged within three to four months of the parents' request.
4 
Subsidized childcare for infants is, however, restricted to families and children with 
special needs, and hence, enrollment for infants is negligible.
5 
                                                 
3 Publicly subsidized childcare comes in different forms, the most common being center-based care. 
Different forms of family daycare—e.g., care provided in a publicly-paid caretaker’s home or in the 
child’s home—also exist, although to a rather small extent (in 2001, only 5 percent of all enrolled 
children had this type of care). Although the financing of childcare is public, care providers can be 
public, cooperative or private. Until the early 1990s, childcare was  almost exclusively publicly 
provided;  since  then,  a  growing  proportion  of  municipalities  have  introduced  voucher  systems, 
paving the way for the private provision of services. These private child care centers still have to 
follow the nationally set curriculum. 
4  There  are  290  local  governments  in  Sweden.  In  addition  to  arranging  childcare,  they  are 
responsible for primary and secondary education, care of the elderly and disabled, welfare and local 
infrastructure. Local governments finance their activities through (in order of their importance) 
proportional local income tax, grants from the central government, and user fees.  
5 Infants are instead cared for by thei r parents. Parents are entitled to a year’s paid parental leave 
with an income replacement rate of 80 per cent up to a cap.   6 






























1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Children 1-2 years Children 3-6 years
Children 7-9 years Children 10-12 years
 
 Source: National Board of Education (Skolverket) 
 
Daycare  centers  offer  services  during  regular  work  hours.  Enrolled  children 
spend on average 32 hours per week at daycare. Although mothers who work full-
time have their children in daycare for longer hours than mothers working half-time 
(34 vs. 21 hours per week in 2005), very few children, even those with both parents 
working  full-time,  attend  daycare  more  than  40  hours  per  week.
6  Anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that strong social norms regulate what parents view as 
adequate staying time. It is therefore interesting to note that attendance times did 
not change during the period of study (Skolverket, 2007), although childcar e 
became cheaper. 
Until 2002, the municipalities were free to set their own childcare charges as 
long as these were "reasonable". According to Government Bill 93/94:11, "child 
care charges must not be so high that parents, for economic reasons, refrain fro m 
letting their child attend a childcare activity that the child would benefit from". This 
definition clearly left room for different interpretations, and consequently, childcare 
fee schedules differed considerably between municipalities with respect to bo th 
levels and construction. In particular, charges varied with family income and the 
                                                 
6 The father’s work time has a much smaller impact on attendance time. Men are also much less 
likely to work part-time (Skolverket, 2007).   7 
age and number of the children. Some municipalities applied a flat charge per child, 
but  most  municipalities  used  complicated  fee schedules  such  that  families  with 
high  incomes  and  few  children,  all  young,  paid  the  highest  charges  per  child. 
However, childcare was heavily subsidized in all municipalities, and only about 
15–20 percent of the municipalities’ childcare costs were covered by user charges.  
Quality of daycare, both before and after the reform, has remained relatively 
homogenous both within and across municipalities. According to Table 1 costs per 
child and personnel intensity has not changed over time. Also there is no reason to 
expect  that  wealthier  families  will  have  access  to  higher-quality  daycare  either 
within  a  particular  municipality  or  between  municipalities.  For  example,  the 
correlation between the average child/teacher ratio and the average income across 
municipalities in 1999 was virtually zero. A reason for this absence of relationship 
is that childcare subsidies are financed through the municipal budget along with 
several other municipal responsibilities such as care for the elderly, education and 
social  welfare.
7  Moreover, user fees are strictly regul ated, and hence, childcare 
services can only be adapted to meet parental preferences for quality within a given 
budget. There is therefore no connection between fees paid by a particular parent 
and the quality of the daycare center that the child attends. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of childcare quality 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
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7 Also differences in income due to differences in the tax base are in principal equalized across municipalities.   8 
2.2  The childcare reform 
In  the  last  months  of  the  election  campaign  before  the  1998  elections,  the 
incumbent (Social Democratic) party proposed a large childcare reform designed to 
reduce user fees and further increase the accessibility of childcare.
8 The Social 
Democrats won the election,   and  the reform bill was passed by parliament in 
November 2000. The motivation for the reform was i) to give all children equal 
access to early education ii) to improve economic conditions for families with 
young children, and iii) to promote parental labor force participation.  
  The reform was implemented gradually and consisted of several parts. The 
most  important  component,  and  the  one  studied  here,  was  an  option  for 
municipalities to impose a cap (set by the central government) on user fees for 
childcare beginning in January 2002.
9  Municipalities that chose to do so were 
granted compensation (at least partially) for lost revenues. As it turned out, all but 
two  municipalities  decided  to  implement  the  capped  fee  schedule  already  in 
January 2002.  The decisions were in most cases made in the fall of 2001.  The 
remaining two municipalities implemented the reform in the following year.
10  
  The capped fee schedule, which has been in place since the reform, has two 
components. First, the charge per child is determined as a fixed percentage of 
household income. The rate varies with the age and birth order of the children, such 
that care for younger children and children with few siblings in childcare costs 
more.
11  Secondly,  per-child  fees  are  capped  and  are  thus  constant  beyond  a 
monthly  income  ceiling,  which  was  SEK  38,000  (6,430  USD)  in  2002.  The 
maximum  amount  paid  by  any  household  was  SEK  2,280  (385  USD)  per 
household and per month in 2002.  
  Prior to the reform, there was substantial variation in childcare fees across 
household types and municipalities. Since the reform, comparable households have 
                                                 
8 Elinder, et al. (2008) analyze the reform’s impact on voter behavior and find that families with 
young children increased their propensity to vote for the incumbent government. 
9 The reform also introduced a right for children whose parents were unemployed or on parental 
leave to attend childcare for a minimum of 15 hours per week. 
10 These municipalities are not included in the study. 
11 The percentage rate for the first child in preschool is 3 percent; the rate is 2 percent for the second 
child and 1 percent for the third child. The corresponding figures for after-school care are 2, 1 and 1 
percent. The household does not pay anything for child number four or for any children thereafter. 
The youngest child is defined as child number 1. Hence, families with one child in preschool and 
one in after-school care pay 4 percent of household income.   9 
faced similar childcare charges regardless of where they live. Overall, childcare 
became  cheaper  as  a  result  of  the  reform.  In  1999,  the  median  middle-income 
family with two adults and two children in pre-school paid SEK 2,660 (380 USD) 
per month, and childcare charges ranged from SEK 1,560 (260 USD) to SEK 3,940 
(670 USD) depending on where the family lived (Skolverket, 1999). In 2002, after 
the implementation of the reform, a similar family paid SEK 1,900 (320 USD) on 
average for the care of their two children, and charges ranged between SEK 1,040 
(175 USD) and SEK 1,900 (320 USD) (Skolverket, 2003). Hence, there was also 
some  variation  after  the  reform  because  municipalities  were  allowed  to  charge 
lower fees than indicated in the national schedule, a possibility that a tiny minority 
of the municipalities used. 
2.3  Fertility and maternal labor supply in Sweden 
From a European perspective, the labor force participation of Swedish women is 
high; it is about 88 percent of the male participation rate. Women are, however, 
more likely to work part-time than men. Part-time work is especially prominent 
among women with small children. One reason is that parents with small children 
have a legal right to work shorter hours (75 percent of full-time). As is shown in 
Figure 2, about 80 percent of women with small children are employed, and half of 
them work part-time. A closer examination of the work hours of women with small 
children shows that there are peaks at 100 and 75 percent, respectively (OECD, 
2005). 
In contrast to most OECD countries, where completed fertility rates have fallen 
considerable over the past few decades, completed fertility in Sweden has remained 
rather  stable  (see  Björklund,  2006).  The  cohorts  of  women  born  1926–59  had 
completed fertility rates around 2.0, with the highest rate (2.11) for the cohort born 
in 1943 and lowest rate (1.96) for the cohort born in 1945.    10 
 
Figure 2 Fraction of women employed and working full-time for different ages 
























1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Child 0-2 yrs Child 3-6 yrs
Child 0-2 yrs, full-time Child 3-6 yrs, full-time
 
Source: OECD (2005) 
 
Total  fertility  rates
12 of Swedish women, however, fluctuate substantially over 
time. Figure 3 shows the average number of children born per woman aged 20 –45 
in Sweden over the period 1968–2006. The figure demonstrates a recession in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, followed by a boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
and lower levels again in the late 1990s. Total fertility rates have, however, picked 
up in recent years from an all-time low of 1.5 in 1999. 
                                                 
12 Total fertility in a given year shows how many children a hypothetical woman would have in her 
lifetime if she had as many children at each age as women of a given age in that particular year.   11 
 
Figure 3 The average number of children born per woman aged 20–45 in 


























































                    Source: Statistics Sweden 
 
The fluctuations in total fertility largely mirror the development of the labor 
market with a lag of a few years, suggesting a link between the two. The correlation 
between total fertility and labor market opportunities is likely to depend on the 
design of the Swedish parental benefit system, which requires parents to qualify for 
income-related benefits by working prior to pregnancy and birth. The qualifying 
rules provide a strong incentive for women to postpone having children until they 
are established in the labor market (Björklund, 2006).
13 
Interestingly, these aggregate numbers show a slight increase in the number of 
children born after t he Swedish childcare reform. Taking a closer look at the 
monthly number of births for the years around the reform, we see that the raw 
numbers do suggest that the increase in the birth rate is rather well timed in relation 
to the reform. Figure 4 shows the   number of births in excess of the monthly 
average for the 1995 –2004  time  period  by  month  from  January  1998  through 
December 2004. The figure suggests that there is a take-off in births in spring of 
                                                 
13  See  Adsera  (2004,  2005)  for  discussions  of  the  link  between  unemployment  and  fertility  in 
explaining cross-country differences in fertility.   12 
2002.  However,  given  the  magnitude  of  the  long-run  cyclical  fluctuations  in 
fertility, we cannot readily interpret this increase as a causal effect of decreased 
childcare costs due to the reform. In order to establish a causal link, we need to 
show that the changes in fertility behavior across different types of households are, 
in fact, related to how these household types were affected by the reform. In the 
next section, we discuss the empirical methodology in detail and present the data 
used to investigate this link. 
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Source: Statistics Sweden. 
 
3  Methodology and data 
3.1  Econometric challenge 
3.1.1   Empirical strategy 
The problem that arises when one aims at estimating the effect of childcare costs on 
fertility  is  that  observed  childcare  costs  for  a  given  household  are  typically 
determined by household characteristics that are also likely to directly influence 
fertility  decisions.  If the Swedish  childcare reform had  implied that changes  in   13 
childcare  charges  were  truly  random  and  thereby  independent  of  household 
characteristics,  it  would  be  straightforward  to  estimate  the  effect  of  the  cost 
changes on fertility. However, this was not the case. The fees were reduced more 
for some types of households than others. In order to achieve unbiased estimates 
indicating the causal effect of childcare costs on fertility, we therefore need to hold 
constant all household characteristics that determine both childcare charges and 
fertility  decisions.  In  many  applications,  this  means  controlling  for  unobserved 
characteristics.  However,  a  survey  of  childcare  fees  conducted  by  IFAU  (for 
details, see Section 3.3) shows that fee schedules, both before and after the reform, 
are fully determined by a subset of observable household characteristics, which 
makes estimating causal effects possible. 
We denote the subset of household characteristics
14 that determines childcare 
fees  by  Z  and  define  J  household  types  as  households  sharing  the  same 
characteristics Zj where j{1,J}, such that in a given municipality m in a given 
time  period,  t,  all  households  of  type  j  have  identical  childcare  costs.  In  other 
words,  for  households  of  type  j,  the  household's  childcare  costs  are  a  function 
Pmt(Zj). It follows that any variation in childcare costs within household type j in a 
given  municipality  is  a  result  of  changes  in  the  fee  schedule  P  over  time.  All 
possible direct effects of Zj on fertility can be accounted for by including a fixed 
effect for each municipality-household type Zjm. More formally, we estimate the 
following relationship: 
 
Childijmt=α+βPmt(Zj)+Zjm+t+εijmt   (1) 
 
where  Childijmt  is  the  probability  that  the  woman  in  household  i  of  type  j,  in 
municipality m and in time period t, bears a child, and where t is a time-fixed 
effect controlling for a common time variation in fertility. Including controls for 
household characteristics that influence fertility but do not influence childcare costs 
(e.g., maternal age and education) is not necessary for unbiased estimates of  β, 
                                                 
14 The variables that determine childcare charges are household income, the number of children and 
the age of each child. These are all available in Swedish register data, and it is therefore possible to 
compute each household's exact childcare fee both before and after the reform, on the assumption 
that all children of childcare-eligible age are enrolled in full-time childcare. We return to this issue 
in Section 3.4.   14 
conditional  on  an  assumption  of  homogenous  responses  to  the  price  change. 
Including such controls may, however, increase efficiency, which is why we will 
do so in the analysis. See discussion in Smith and Todd (2005). 
Our  estimation  strategy  is  to  compare  the  probability  that  the  women  in 
households of a particular type, in a particular municipality, bear children during a 
time window of a given length prior to the reform to the probability that women in 
households of that same type in the same municipality have children in a time 
window of the same length after the reform.
15 The changes in fertility behavior are 
then related to the changes in childcare costs induced by the reform for the same 
household type across different municipalities and for other types of households in 
the same municipality. This strategy produces a difference-in-differences estimator, 
where households are matched and compared at the household type×municipality 
level. The resulting estimate of β, is the weighted-sum over all household types of 
the difference-in-differences estimates of fertility changes across municipalities and 
time  within  a  given  household  type,  where  the  weights  are  determined  by  the 
number of households grouped together for each household type j.  
3.1.2  Potential challenges to identification 
The identifying assumption behind equation (1) is that controlling for fixed time-
effects and household type×municipality effect is enough to capture everything that 
varies at the household type level or at the municipality level and also correlates 
with the reform induced changes in childcare costs. One thing that the specification 
in equation (1) does not allow for is trends at the household type level or at the 
municipality level. If households with certain characteristics or households in some 
municipalities exhibit specific trends that are unrelated to the reform but co-varies 
with the price changes β can no longer be interpreted as a causal effect. This type of 
pattern may be due to underlying trends, unobserved changes in general policy or 
local reforms. Our strategy to avoid misinterpreting correlations as causations is to 
conduct placebo-experiments, where we estimate effects of the childcare reform 
already before the reform was announced. If we then find a statistically significant 
                                                 
15 The reason that we compare household of the same type over time rather than to follow the same households 
over time is that the children in the households will be older after the reform than before and we believe that 
age of already born children  is very likely to have a direct effect on the fertility behavior of mothers.   15 
effect  of  the  future  reform,  we  will  conclude  that  the  model  is  not  correctly 
specified and re-estimate the model allowing for different sets of trends and time-
specific effects before interpreting the point estimates as causal effects. 
Another issue of concern is whether the childcare reform had effects on the 
quality of the care provided and/or whether access to care was affected as a result 
of  increased  demand.  Such  effects  could,  potentially,  confound  the  effects  on 
fertility of a reduction in fees. As regards the provision of care services, the reform 
is  not  likely  to  have  had  any  major  impact  on  access  to  childcare  because 
municipalities had been obliged by law to provide a child with childcare within 3 
months of parental demand as early as 1993. This obligation did not change. The 
reform,  however,  implied  guaranteed  access  to  childcare  for  a  minimum  of  15 
hours per week for the children of unemployed persons and parents on parental 
leave caring for new siblings of their older children. These are the reason for the 
increase in enrollment seen in Figure 1 above. However, as discussed earlier and 
shown inTable 1, the number of enrolled children per childcare employee, as well 
as the share of childcare employees with training in pedagogics, remained constant 
between 2001 and 2003. Furthermore, if anything, the total cost per enrolled child 
increased slightly between 2001 and 2003. Hence, there is no evidence that the 
reform implied lower-quality childcare. 
Our identification strategy assumes that the reform induced cost changes for 
each  household-municipality  type  are  exogenous  and  do  not  depend  on  other 
characteristics affecting fertility decisions and fees. It is therefore problematic if 
families that were insensitive to the cost of childcare were more likely to reside in 
municipalities  with  high  fees  prior  to  the  reform.  In  this  case,  the  households 
receiving  the  largest  reductions  would  be  the  least  responsive  to  changes  in 
childcare costs. Such a selection problem might lead us to underestimate the impact 
of the reform on fertility and may potentially bias our results against finding any 
effects. However, it is also possible that fees were high in some municipalities, 
prior to the reform, in response to an inflow of families demanding childcare for 
their children. It is not clear how such families bias the results. Another possibility 
is that the reform encouraged families planning more children to move to locations 
where  they  would  receive  large  fee  cuts.  The  method  of  reducing  the  biases   16 
resulting from families’ residence decisions due to the reform that we adopt in the 
analysis  is  to  compute  household  childcare  fees  and  register  fertility  in  the 
municipality of residence prior to the reform. This implies that, if families move in 
response to the fee cuts we will register childbirths in the wrong municipality and, 
as  a  result,  underestimate  the  magnitude  of  the  effects.  To  make  sure  that  our 
results are not driven by the, possibly endogenous, moving patterns of individuals, 
we  also  perform  a  robustness  check  where  we  exclude  households  that  have 
recently moved into the municipality as well as households that move away from 
the municipality.  
3.2  When do people react to the reform? 
Several years passed after that the Social Democrats first launched the idea of a 
childcare fee reform in 1998 until the capped fees were actually implemented in 
2002. Table 2 below presents different important dates for the reform. 
 








1998  Election promise and election victory of the Social Democrats  July 1999  
1999  The fee reform bill is prepared in the government  July 2000 
2000  Decision made at the central level  July 2001 
2001  Decisions made at the local level  July 2002 
2002  The capped fees implemented  July 2003 
 
It is far from obvious when we should expect household to react to the reduced 
childcare fees.  ―True believers‖ with high trust in politicians election promises 
could  potentially  decide  to  have  an  additional  child  already  when  the  Social 
Democrats  won  the  election  in  the  autumn  in  1998.  Taking  the  nine-month 
gestation period into account, July 1999 is in that case when we can expect to 
register births that are induced by the reform. If households on the other hand did 
not believe that the reform would be implemented until the reform bill was being   17 
prepared,the first births affected by the reform would be in July 2000. In 2000 the 
decision was made at the central level to implement the reform, but it was still 
voluntary for municipalities to implement the capped fee-schedules and it was not 
until  the  end  of  2001  that  most  local  governments  made  the  final  decisions  to 
implement the reform. Hence, it is possible that it was not until July 2002 that we 
can  start  to  observe  births  affected  by  the  reform.  Most  likely,  some  types  of 
households reacted early whereas other types reacted late. 
In order to account for the uncertainty about when households react, we estimate 
a reform effect for each year before and after the reform. Doing this, we are able to 
trace the dynamic response of household fertility to the reform process. Hence, we 
estimate a model where we first calculate the price change for each household type 
in year t, given the old and reformed fee schedule in each municipality and then 
interact this price change with a time dummy, t, producing T-1 β-estimates, where 
T is the number of years of data. The equation we estimate is hence given by  
 
ΔChildjmt=α+βt ΔPm(Zj)+ t + ΔXjmt +Δεjmt,     (2) 
 
where  ΔChildjmt  is  the  change  in  the  probability  that  a  household  of  type  j  in 
municipality m will have an additional child in a defined time window and ΔXjmt is 
the change in mean characteristics that do not determine childcare fees, but are 
important  for  fertility  decisions,  in  the  household  type  –  municipality  cell.  In 
particular,  we  include  maternal  age  and  education  as  a  means  to  improve 
efficiency.  In measuring  ΔChildjmt we define a set of 12-month time windows 
starting in July in each of the years after we observe households and ending in June 
the next year. Hence, household characteristics are measured in December of year t 
for t=[1,…,T] childcare fees are computed for January of year t+1 onwards, and 
fertility behavior is measures from July of year t+1 through June t+2. 
3.3  Data 
We use data from two sources. Information on fee schedules comes from a survey 
of municipal childcare charge tariffs conducted by The Institute for Labour Market   18 
Policy Evaluation (IFAU).
16 Information on household characteristics and fertility 
comes from register data from Statistics Sweden.  
We sample all couples in which the woman  is 20–45 years old in each year 
1996–2003, since these are the women ―at risk‖ of being affected by the price 
change. Thus, we define household characteristics 1996 and births July 1998 to 
July 1999, characteristics 1997 and births July 1999 to July 2000, and so forth. 
Each year we exclude the women that gave birth in the previous 6 months, i.e. Jant–
Junet since these are not at risk of having another child. The selected time period 
implies that we have two years of data that are undoubtedly unaffected by the 
reform. This makes it possible to perform one true placebo-experiment, comparing 
changes  in  fertility  for  the  sample  of  households  1996  to  1997  to  changes  in 
behavior for the 1997 and 1998 samples. The reason for not going further back in 
time is that the pre-reform fee schedules collected through the survey were those 
that were in place in 2001, and we do not have information about the schedules 
actually in place prior to this year. Therefore, the further back in time we go, the 
larger will the measurement error in our price measure be. 
Because  Swedish  register  data  does  not  code  cohabiting  couples  without 
common  children  as  household  units,  our  sample  excludes  unmarried  women 
without children, single mothers, and cohabiting unmarried mothers whose partners 
are not the fathers of their children. For these women, we are unable to obtain a 
correct  measure  of  household  income  because  we  cannot  identify  the  potential 
father.
17 As a result, our analysis of first births is restricted to married couples. This 
is unfortunate because a high fraction of Swedish first-borns, more than two thirds, 
are born out of wedlock (www.SCB.se). The results we present for childless 
women are therefore not representative of the population of childless women 
because married couples are likely to differ from unmarried couples in several 
                                                 
16 IFAU collected childcare fee data via an email request sent to all Swedish municipalities asking 
for exact formulas used to calculate prices in 2001–04. Information about the exact fee structure 
from 220 of Sweden's 290 municipalities was received. Comparing the pre-reform childcare costs 
for a number of type families in the municipalities that responded with those of the municipalities 
that did not respond (available in Skolverket, 1999), we conclude that the costs are very similar, 
which implies that we need not worry about selection based on a specific type of municipality. 
17 We have tried to impute household income for these unmarried childless women using predictions 
from the sample for which we observe both parents. Because we were unable to replicate our results 
for the married women using predicted household income, we judge that the results for unmarried 
childless women are too speculative and uncertain.   19 
respects. It is, however, not clear if they should be expected to be more or less 
sensitive to changes in childcare fees than unmarried couples. 
For the households in our sample, we obtain register-based information on the 
woman’s age and education, the annual income for the woman and her partner, and 
the number of children living in the household and their respective ages. We also 
obtain register information on if and when the women give birth. 
3.4  Computing childcare costs and birth rates 
Childcare  charges  depend  on  a  limited  number  of  observable  household 
characteristics.  Given  knowledge  of  these  characteristics,  we  can  compute  the 
households’ exact childcare costs. We compute the marginal cost of having one 
additional child by calculating the present value of total remaining cost of childcare 
assuming that the newborn will be enrolled in childcare at age 1 and continue in 
childcare until age ten.
18 We expect a negative effect of the marginal childcare cost 
on households’ fertility decisions. 
For households that already have children attending childcare, the reform also 
implied  an  income  effect,  since  it  became  cheaper  to  have  these  children  in 
childcare.  We  therefore  also  compute  a  measure  of  the  present  value  of  total 
remaining  cost  of  childcare  for  the  children  already  present  in  the  household 
assuming that each child will be enrolled in full-time care until it reaches the age of 
ten (cost of presently enrolled).  
Table 3 presents the present value of the remaining childcare costs according to 
the  pre-  and  post-reform  fee  schedules  for  a  marginal  additional  child 
(MC=marginal cost) and the children already present in households with children 
(SQ=status quo) (Columns 1 and 2) and for having a first child for households 
without children (MC=marginal cost) (Column 3) for the true reform year, 2002. 
When computing pre-reform costs, we apply the pre-reform fee schedules reported 
in  survey  responses.
  19  Post-reform  costs  are  computed  using  the  reform  fee 
                                                 
18 Note that we do not observe whether children attend childcare or for how many hours they do so. 
The cost measure we calculate is based on the assumption that everyone attends childcare and after-
school care full-time. We have further assumed that the families discount future costs exponentially 
with the discount rate 0.05. Within reasonable limits, the results are not sensitive to the choice of 
discount factor.  
19  The  information  collected  by  IFAU  pertains  to  the  fee  schedules  as  they  were  in  2001. 
Information on prices scheduled prior to 2001 is not available, but the survey informa tion suggests   20 
schedule as it was stipulated by central government, thus assuming that the capped 
fees were implemented in the same way across the country.  
As is clear from the table, comparing the pre-reform and post-reform costs for 
childcare,  these  decreased  dramatically  due  to  the  reform.  On  average,  the  net 
present value of remaining childcare costs decreased by more than 50 percent. The 
drop in the standard deviation of childcare costs also shows that the variation in 
fees across households decreased radically when the reformed national fee schedule 
replaced local fee schedules.  
Table 3 Pre-reform and post-reform remaining childcare costs in SEK 000s   
  Households with children  Households 
without children 
























Note: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis 
 
The capping of childcare charges implied that the largest cost cuts occurred for 
households that initially had high childcare costs. In order to encourage a better 
understanding of which type of households experienced the largest cost 
reductions,  
Table 4shows changes in total remaining childcare costs (marginal cost + cost for 
presently enrolled) at different parity and household income levels. Note that the 
largest cost changes occurred for well-off families that already had two children, 
while low-income households without children received a much smaller reduction 
                                                                                                                                        
that there were no major changes in local fee schedules in the years prior to the reform. As a result, 
we use the fee schedule for 2001 to compute what the household pre-reform fee was in the years 
prior to 2001. Although inflation was minor during these years, we have denominated household 
incomes in 2001 prices using a consumer price index in order to achieve comparability across years.   21 
in childcare cost. Although the within-family variation in childcare cost changes 
was smaller for families with low incomes or few children,  
Table 4 also illustrates that the reform introduced substantial variation in costs for 
households with similar incomes and the same number of children.  
 
Table 4 Change in present value of remaining childcare cost (total cost) for a 
household experiencing the birth of one additional child, SEK 
Parity  Household income 
  Low  Medium  High 
       






       






       






       
Note: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Total remaining child cost =MC +SQ 
3.5  Defining household types 
The  estimation  strategy  discussed  in  section  3.1.1.  relies  on  comparisons  of 
households that are identical with respect to all factors affecting both childcare fees 
and fertility but that experience different changes in childcare costs because they 
live in different municipalities. To achieve such a comparison, we need i) to define 
household  types  based  on  income,  the  number  of  children  and  the  age  of  the 
children; and ii) to observe each household type in at least two municipalities, both 
before and after the reform. In defining household types, we therefore face a trade-
off.  The  more  narrowly  we  define  household  types,  the  more  precisely  is  our 
measure  of  childcare  costs,  the  smaller  is  the  within-household  variance  in 
characteristics that determine childcare charges and, hence, the more truly random 
is  the  within-household  variation  in  childcare  costs.  The  drawback  of  defining   22 
household types too narrowly is that we are less likely find matches over time for 
the same household type in at least two municipalities. Hence, the more precise are 
our household types, the less representative is the sample used for estimation. 
This  problem  is  fruitfully  illustrated  by  the  example  of  household  income. 
Household  income  is  a  continuous  variable,  and  it  is  therefore  not  possible  to 
perform an unconstrained match. Doing so would prevent us from finding matches 
for most of our household types. Instead, we use monthly income spans of SEK 
1,000 in 2002 prices. When attempting to match the exact age of each child, a 
similar problem arises. Instead, we choose to define household types by the number 
of children under the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child and the age 
category of each of the next three youngest children, and the household’s monthly 
income span. We consider the four youngest children in the household because 
only a few municipalities before the reform (and none after) charged fees for the 
fifth child or any thereafter. The age categories are defined in line with the typical 
age categories determining childcare charges: 1–3, 4–5 and 6–9.  
4  Results: Effects of childcare costs on 
fertility 
4.1  Baseline estimates 
There are two different groups of potential parents that are likely to be affected by 
the reform differently; households with children and households with no previous 
children. For the former group the reform has both an income and a price effect, 
whereas for households with no previous children there is only a price effect. We 
will therefore estimate the model in equation (2) for each group separately. 
Table 5 presents the result for families without children.
20 First we inspect 
the estimate on the first row , ΔMC_1997. Since the capped fee reform was first 
presented as an election promise in 1998 there could be no effect of the reform for 
the first year in our estimations. As expected the estimate for ΔMC_1997 is small 
                                                 
20 This sample only includes married couples, since register data does not allow us to capture cohabiting 
couples without common children.   23 
and  insignificant,  and  suggests  that  there  are  no  underlying  trends  in  the 
specification. This specification will be our preferred one. 
 
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women   24 
Table 5 Child care costs and fertility – Households without children 
Turning to the other estimates we see that for the years 1998, 1999 and 
2000  the  point  estimates  are  in  the  range  -0.1–  -0.17,  indicating  that  higher 
marginal  childcare  costs  do  indeed  decrease  fertility.    However,  the  only 
statistically  significant  point  estimate  is  the  one  for  2000,  suggesting  that 
households reacted when the reform was passed in the parliament (see Table 2). At 
this time the households knew that children born July 2001- July 2002 would get 
the lower price when they turned one and thus where eligible for subsidized child 
care. The estimated effect is large, a household with an average reduction in fees 



























     Year FE  Yes 
     Observations  44,917 
R-squared  0.117 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance 
at the 10%-level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by 
household monthly income span of 1,000 SEK.    25 
increased fertility with 9.0 percent. A back of the envelop calculation implies that a 
10000 US dollar (or Euro) reduction in the present value of the future marginal 
child care costs would increase fertility rates with 7.5 (9.8) percent. The negative 
(but insignificant) estimates for 1998 and 1999 may suggest that a subgroup of the 
households  anticipated  the  reform  already  when  the  Social  Democrats  won  the 
election and reacted by having children.  
Both  control  variables;  the  woman’s  age  and  education  level  are  highly 
significant. Younger women are more likely to have children than older women and 
more highly educated women with a university degree are more likely to have a 
child than women with lower education. 
Next we turn to the households who already have children in childcare age. The 
results are presented in  
Table 6 below. Column (1) presents the result from the specification given by 
equation (2), i.e. a difference-in-difference specification at the household type × 
municipality level. Since the reform was first mentioned in the election campaign 
1998 we should not expect to find any effect of the reform for the first year in our 
estimations (i.e. ΔMC_1997 and ΔSQ_1997). However, as is clear from the results, 
we do find statistically (and economically) significant coefficients on the variables 
capturing the future changes in prices (both for marginal cost and the ―status quo‖-
costs). These estimates suggest a presence of preexisting time trends in the birth 
rates of household types that that correlate with future price changes. In column (2) 
we therefore estimate a model where we control for time-specific household type-
effects.
21 Doing this, we find that the estimates for  the pre-reform year 1997 are 
both statistically and economically insignificant. The specification in column (2) 
will therefore be our preferred specification. 
 
Table 6  Childcare costs and fertility – Households with children 
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 
                                                 
21 We have also elaborated with a linear household-type trend, and a linear municipality trend respectively. 
Doing this, we still find an effect the first year, and we therefore reject those specifications. These results are 
available upon request.    26 
































































Year FE  Yes  Yes   27 
Household type×year FE  No  Yes 
Observations  628,997  628,997 
R-squared  0.022  0.069 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance 
at the 10%-level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by the 
number of children under the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child, the age category (ages 
0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of the next three youngest children and a household monthly income span of 1,000 
SEK.  
Turning to the parameter estimates for effects of a change in marginal cost on 
fertility in column (2) there is a weakly significant negative effect in 1999. This 
indicates  that  households  with  children  reacted  slightly  earlier  than  households 
without children, i.e. when the proposal was prepared. The size of the parameter 
estimate is -0.071, which is a smaller effect than for households without children. 
Also, the estimates for the other years in which households could potentially have 
reacted,  are  not  going  in  the  same  (negative)  direction.  Hence,  the  pattern  for 
households with children is less clear than for childless households.  
If  we  instead  focus  on  the  income-effect  induced  by  the  reform  (the  ΔSQ  -
estimates) we find a positive parameter estimate of 0.079 in 1998, indicating a 
negative income effect already when the Social Democrats won the election.  A 
household  with  average  reductions  in  childcare  costs  of  about  56000,  hence 
decreased their fertility with 4.4 children per thousand households, or 6 %.
22 
 
4.2  Robustness tests  
In the analysis above, we have let ―data talk‖ in the respect that we have accepted 
the specifications of the models if the placebo-results have shown zero-effects. For 
households without children, this implied accepting the DD-specification without 
additional trends. For households with children, zero-effects in the placebo tests 
required  a  specification  with  household-type  time-specific  effects.  The 
identification  hence  relies  on  the  assumption  that  such  effects  are  lacking  for 
households without children and that there are no underlying municipal trends in 
                                                 
22 See appendix tables for average birth rates for different types of household types and average childcare cost 
reductions. 0.079*56.6)/74.37=0.06.   28 
neither of the two household types. In order to test whether our results are sensitive 
to including these types of trends we conduct some robustness checks introducing 
different types of trends. However, one should be aware that including trends does 
not  come  without  a  cost;  the  more  trends  we  allow  for,  less  of  the  potentially 
identifying variation are used in the estimations.  
According to the results in Table 5 households without children reacted to the 
price change by increasing fertility rates. The results presented in Table 7 columns 
(1) and (2) include household type×year fixed effects and municipality specific 
trends, respectively. Including household type and time fixed effects reduces the 
estimates somewhat and increases the standard errors substantially. Although the 
estimates are no longer statistically significant the general picture is the same as in 
the preferred baseline specification. When including municipality specific trends, 
the  effect  of  marginal  childcare  costs  fertility  becomes  stronger,  and  also  the 
estimates for 1998 and 1999 are statistically significant on the 10 percent level. 
Because  one  may  worry  that  the  result  is  driven  by  endogenous  residence 
decisions  we  next re-estimate  our preferred specifications excluding households 
that either recently moved to the municipality or moved from the municipality in 
the  year  of  investigation.  The  result  presented  in  column  (3)  shows  parameter 
estimates that are slightly larger in magnitude  
The robustness checks in Table 7 support our conclusion that the childcare fee 
reform induced married couples with no former children to increase fertility.   29 
Table 7 Robustness check – Households without children 
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 

















































Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household     
type×year FE 
Yes  No  No 
Municipal trend  No  Yes  No 
Excluding movers  No  No  Yes 
Observations  44,917  44,917  43,442 
R-squared  0.145  0.119  0.118 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance 
at the 10%-level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by the 
number of children under the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child, the age category (ages 
0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of the next three youngest children and a household monthly income span of 1,000 
SEK.  
   30 
Next, we turn to households that already have children in ages eligible for 
subsidized child care and test the robustness of the results in  
Table 6. Column (1) in Table 8 presents the results when including municipality 
specific trends to the baseline specification. The borderline significant effect 
previously found now disappears although the point estimate is of similar 
magnitude as before. Column (2) shows the preferred specification from  
Table 6 but excluding movers. This does not change the results   found above; 
there is a price effect of the expected sign and a negative income effect. 
Table 8 Robustness checks – Households with children 
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 






































































Control variables  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes 
Household type×year FE  Yes  Yes 
Municipal trend  Yes  No 
Excluding movers  No  Yes 
Observations  628,997  614,025 
R-squared  0.069  0.069 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance 
at the 10%-level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by the 
number of children under the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child, the age category (ages 
0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of the next three youngest children and a household monthly income span of 1,000 
SEK.  
 
4.2 Heterogeneous effects with respect to the number of children 
From our preferred specification in  
Table 6 we concluded that there is a marginally significant price effect and an 
income  effect  working  in  opposite  directions;  thus  if  anything,  the  change  in 
marginal  cost  made  families  increase  their  demand  for  children,  whereas  the 
decline in the costs for the already present children decreased families’ demand for 
children. However, in the group ―families with children‖ households differ with 
respect to how many children they have before the reform and it is possible that 
effects differ by parity.    32 
In  
Table 9 we therefore allow the parameter estimates to differ for families with only 
one child and families with two or more children. Column (1) presents the results 
from the preferred baseline model, column (2) includes municipality specific trends 
and  (3)  excludes  movers.  The  results  confirm  that  households  do  in  fact  react 
differently to the reform depending on parity. Households with one child reacted to 
the lower marginal costs induced by the reform by postponing their births one year 
(there is positive effect in 1998 and a negative effect in 1999). Thus they postponed 
having children until the proposal was prepared in the government. 
Households with two or more children, on the other hand, do not seem to react 
to  reduced  marginal  costs;  all  the  ΔMC2-estimates  are  statistically  (and 
economically) insignificant. The negative income effect, however, is present at all 
parities. The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of municipality trends or to 
excluding movers. 
 
Table 9 Childcare costs and fertility – heterogeneous effects with respect to 
parity 





































































































































































































Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household type×year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipal trend  No  Yes  No 
Excluding movers  No  No  Yes 
Observations  628,997  628,997  614,025 
R-squared  0.069  0.069  0.069 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance 
at the 10%-level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by the 
number of children under the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child, the age category (ages 
0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of the next three youngest children and a household monthly income span of 1,000 
SEK. 
Conclusions  
We have explored the effect of reducing childcare costs on the fertility behavior of 
Swedish families.  We explore the variation in costs induced by a childcare fee 
reform which was announced as a Social Democratic election promise in 1998 and 
was  implemented  in  2002.  The  reform  lowered  the  marginal  cost  of  having 
additional  children,  but  also  implied  a  positive  income  shock  for  families  that 
already  had  children  enrolled  in  childcare.  Our  analysis  of  the  dynamics  of   35 
childbirth for the years around the reform suggests that married couples without 
children reacted already to the election victory of the Social Democrats in 1998 by 
having children. Households with one child did not increase their total demand for 
children, but appear to have postponed second births until they were more certain 
that  the  reform  would  indeed  take  place.  However,  families  with  two  or  more 
children did not react at all to the reduction in the marginal cost. We find a negative 
income effect of reduced childcare costs for families that already had children.  
Married couples without previous children was the only group, of those analysed 
that increased fertility as a response to the reform. The reform implied a reduction 
of child care costs of on average 86 200 SEK (11 900 USD). The effect was to 
increase fertility rates with 9 percent. Given that couples that marry prior to having 
children is a select group in Sweden and make up only about a third of first births, 
it is not possible to generalize the result to the first birth in general. Yet, we can 
compare the magnitude of the estimated effect with the findings of other studies 
that investigate the effect of other economic incentives on fertility. Milligan (2005) 
investigates the effects of a pro-natalist transfer policy implemented in Quebec, in 
which  mothers  received  a  cash  bonus  for  giving  birth.  Using  the  exogenous 
variation  created  by  the  reform,  he  finds  that  there  is  a  substantial  impact  of 
childcare allowances on fertility rates. Milligan finds that a cash bonus of 1,000 
Canadian Dollars (USD 950) increased fertility by 16 percent. Laroque and Salanié 
(2004), instead, apply a structural model of maternal labor supply and fertility to 
French data and  family policies  (although  ignoring the  effects  of childcare).  In 
simulations, they find that increasing mothers’ earnings reduces fertility but that 
increasing child support during the first three years, with what would correspond to 
a present value cash transfer of some USD 20,000, would increase fertility by a 
quarter. Finally, Cohen et. al. (2009) find, investigating the effects of Israeli child 
subsidies, that a reduction of USD 34 in monthly subsidies for a marginal child 
decreases  fertility  by  8  percent.  The  effects  found  in  this  study  for  childless 
households are somewhat smaller in magnitude.  
How can we understand the effects? Elinder et al (2008) shows that the election 
promise indeed had an impact on voting behavior. It hence appears that the promise 
was regarded as credible, which makes it more comprehensible that young married   36 
couples went ahead and had children, knowing that they would benefit from lower 
child care costs. It is, however, hard to assess if the effect on first births have any 
impact on cohort fertility. The timing effect on families with one child, suggests 
however that the reform did not increase the demand for children beyond the strong 
two child norm present in Sweden. Instead, this group of households may have 
postponed the second child to make sure they benefitted from the low cost for a 
maximal time period.  
The reduction in fertility in response to lower childcare costs for the children 
already in enrolled childcare is suggestive of a negative income effect for families 
with children, in line what is found for some groups of households in Cohen et al 
(2009). Although speculative, it is possible that the reduction in child care costs 
may have increased parents investments in the quality of the children they already 
had rather than having more children. It is also possible that this group of parents 
feared childcare quality would decline as a result of lower childcare fees. The fact 
that Lundin et al (2008) finds zero-effects on labor supply of mothers with young 
children, is compatible with the idea that these mothers chose to continue to work 
part time rather than having children. Fewer children implies an increase in average 
labor supply for the group as a whole (because fewer parents go on leave), but this 
effect may have been off-set by a reduction in hours to spend time with the children 
they already had.  
   37 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Variable definitions 
Child: Dummy that takes the value 1 if the household had a child in an 18-month period 
Marginal cost: The present value of the cost of an additional child enrolled in full-time child care until the age 
of 10. 
Status quo childcare cost: The present value of the child care costs associated with having the family’s 
existing children  
enrolled in full-time childcare until the age of 10. 
Age:  Age of the women in the households minus the median age (34) 
University: Dummy that takes the value 1 if the woman in the household has some university education 
The data is collapsed at the household-municipal level, and therefore one observation will be the household 
type  municipality  averageyear 
Age 35+: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the woman in the household is 35 or older. 
Childless couple: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household has no children 
One child: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household has one child 
Two children: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household has two children 
Three or more children: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household has three or more children.   40 
Table A.2  Birth rates per 1000 women 1997-2001 and mean characteristics in 
2000 
  Childless 
households 
Households with children 
 
Variable    all  one child  at least 
two 
children 
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